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1. Introduction
 In repeated games with private monitoring, the players’ beliefs about past play
will gradually drift apart as the game goes on, which makes it difficult to sustain an
equilibrium that is based on common beliefs. One way to restore common belief about
the aspects of past play that matter for forecasts of future play is for players to send
“cheap-talk” messages to one another; if these messages are truthful, they will form a
public state that can be used to govern the players’ strategies.  However, one of the first
results on using communication in this way is negative: Matsushima [1991] proved that
payoffs of equilibria with truthful, incentive compatible revelation of the signals every
period are bounded away from efficiency in two-player games with independent signals.
Subsequently, Compte [1998] and Kandori and Matsushima [1998] proved a folk
theorem for two-player games with independent signals, by considering strategies that
only report truthfully every T periods, where T goes to infinity as the discount factor goes
to 1.
3
This paper shows how communication can yield a Nash-threats folk theorem in
two-player games with “almost public” information but without independent signals.
4
Our proof is a combination of the idea that communication provides a public signal and
an idea from Mailath and Morris [2002]. They provided a sufficient condition for a
perfect public equilibrium of a game with public information to remain equilibrium when
the information structure is perturbed to be almost public. We build on these ideas by
introducing the possibility that the messages sent are coarser than the underlying private
signals, which extends the class of games where our information conditions are satisfied.
A key hypothesis of the Mailath and Morris folk theorem is that the equilibrium
strategies for the public information game depend only on a finite history of play. This
                                                
3 In addition, these papers, and also Ben-Porath and Kahneman [1996], proved folk theorems for games
with at least three players. With three or more players the report of a third player can be used to tell who is
misreporting. We should also note that there are a number of folk theorem and related results in the two-
player case without communication: Sekiguchi [1997], Ely and Valimaki [2002], Piccione [2002] and
Bhaskar and Obara [2002] have all studied the prisoner’s dilemma game without communication.
4 By “communication” we mean communication between the players, without the benefit of an
intermediary. Aoyagi [2002] proves a folk theorem for games with a third-party mediator who receives
private reports from the players and sends them non-binding instructions, as in the communication games
of Forges [1986] and Myerson [1986].  See Kandori [2002] for a survey of studies of repeated games with
private monitoring, both with and without communication.2
implies that the strategies have a finite-automaton description. Consequently, when the
information structure is close enough to public information, the current states of the
automata are almost common knowledge.  Since repeated games with perfect information
have efficient equilibria with finite memory, the Mailath-Morris result yields a folk
theorem for games of almost-perfect, almost-public information, but the hypothesis of
this theorem need not be satisfied for general games of almost-public information.
Our starting point is a game of publicly observed signals, and the Fudenberg,
Levine and Maskin [1994] (FLM) result that a folk theorem holds if there is “sufficient”
public information. When players observe private signals but make public
announcements, there is the possibility of constructing "FLM-like" equilibria in which
the players’ actions depend only on the announcements. However, the FLM techniques
cannot be immediately applied, because it is necessary for the equilibrium to provide
incentives for the players to “report truthfully.”
The basic contribution of this paper is to show how this can be done when players
receive signals that are highly but not perfectly correlated. Although the results
generalize from the two-person case, in many respects it is an advantage to have more
than two players, because it is possible to build equilibria by comparing the reports of
different players, and using “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts. For this reason
we focus here on the two-player case, and show that even without third parties, we have a
folk theorem when the players’ signals are highly correlated.
2. The Model
In the stage game, each of two players    I   simultaneously chooses an action
I A  from a finite set  I ! . We refer to vectors of actions, one for each player, as profiles.
Player  I ’s payoff to an action profile A  is  	 I GA. We define  ￿ MAX  	 IA I GG A  . In
addition, each player observes a private signal  II Z:   a finite set. We let  ￿￿  	 ZZ Z  ,
￿￿ ::: q .  Each action profile  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  	 AA A ! ! !   q  induces a probability
distribution  A Q  over outcomes  Z .  At the end of each stage of the game, players make
announcements  
 I Y9  , where  
 9  is a finite set that is the same for each player.
5  A
                                                
5 The assumption that the two players have the same sets of possible announcements is motivated by our
focus on almost-public information. Although we can always increase the size of the smaller message
space, doing so involves a loss of generality because increasing the possible messages can increase the set
of potential equilibria.3
profile of announcements is a  

 Y9 9 9  q. A stage game strategy for player I,
 	 II I SA M  , is a choice of stage game action  I A  and a map  
 II M: 9 l  from
private signal to announcements. We refer to  ￿￿  	 MM M   as a message profile. We let
I 3  denote the space of player I’s stage game strategies.
In the repeated game, in each period    T  ! , the stage game is played. At the
start of each period, a public randomization  ;= W   is drawn from a uniform
distribution. The public history at time T ,  () ht , consists of the announcements and
realization of w signals in all previous periods, and also the realization of w in period t, so
 	  	 	 	 	   	  	  		 HT W Y W Y WT YT WT   ! .
The private history for player I  at time T  is
 	  	 	 	 	   	  		 II I I II I HT A Z A Z AT ZT   ! .
A strategy for player I  is a sequence of maps  	 I T T  mapping the public and private
histories  	  	 I HT H T  to probability distributions over  I 3 . A partial strategy is the strategy
conditional on the initial realization of the public randomization device.  A public
strategy is a strategy that depends only on  	 HT . We denote the null private history for
player i by  (1) i h ; the initial public history is  (1) h .  Observe that for each public history
	 HT  the public profile  T  induces a partial profile over the repeated game beginning at
T . We denote this by <> \ 	 HT T .  Given a private partial profile  T , we can use the
probability distribution generated by the partial profile and the null initial history to
compute for each player I  an expected average present value with discount factor
 E b. We denote this by  	 I ' TE . A perfect public equilibrium is a public strategy
profile  T  such that for any public history  	 HT  and any private partial strategy  I T   by any
player I  we have
<> < > 	
 \  	  	  \  	  	 II I I 'H T ' H T TE T T E ￿ p  .
Note that by standard dynamic programming arguments it is sufficient to consider
deviations to public strategies.
3. The Structure of Information
Given our assumption of a common announcement space, it is convenient to think
of players agreeing if they make the same announcement as each other. We can think of

 9  as being the subset of 9  in which  ￿￿ YY  , and refer to this as the diagonal of 9 .4
Given a message profile M , the information structure Q  induces a distribution over the
diagonal of announcement profiles. We denote by
 
￿￿ ￿￿ \￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
 	 	 M
AA ZM Z M Z Y YZ QQ
￿￿   ,
the probability of the diagonal point 
 
 	 YY, and by
￿

 	

 \ 
 	
	
M
A M
A M
A Y9
Y
Y9
Y
Q
Q
Q
￿


the probability conditional on the diagonal of the joint announcement  
 Y .  It is also
convenient to define the probability of the opponent’s message given a player’s signal
\￿ ￿ \ 	 \ 	
II I I
M
AA II II ZMZ Y YZ ZZ QQ
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   .
Note that for this to be well defined there must be positive probability of I receiving the
signal  I Z  when the players play A .
Definition 1: A game has  	 FO  public information with respect to M  if for all action
profiles a,
(1)  ￿
￿
￿ 	  MM
AA Y9 Y QQ F
￿ wp  
(2) if  	  A Z Q   then for all  ￿ 	 II YM Z v ,  ￿ \	  	 \	 MM
AI A I I I YZ M Z Z QQ O b
When this condition is satisfied for some positive n  and “small” F we say that the
game has “almost public messaging.”  This condition says that most of the time, each
player is fairly confident of the other player's message; in the limit case of (0,n )-public
information, the two players’ messages are perfectly correlated, so that they are public
information.  This condition is closely related to the Mailath and Morris definition of
“F-close to public monitoring,” but it is weaker in two ways. First of all, Mailath and
Morris suppose that each player i’s private signal  I Z  lies in the same set as do the signals
in the limiting pubic-information game; in our setting this corresponds to 
 I 9:  .
Second, they suppose that in the public information limit, every signal has strictly
positive probability under every action profile, and that the distribution of each player's
private signals is close to this limit.  These conditions imply condition (1) above, and a
stronger version of condition (2), namely that  ￿ LIM   	 \ 	  M
AI I I MZ Z F Q l  .  Given the
assumption that 
 I 9:  , their conditions are equivalent to ours, but when there are5
many private signals corresponding to a given public message, our condition (2) is
significantly weaker, as it allows the private signals to differ in how informative they are
about the message the opposing player will send.
Note that our condition is easier to satisfy with coarse message maps m, and
indeed it is vacuously satisfied if  ￿￿ ÅANDÅ MM  are equal to the same constant; the
condition will have force when combined with the assumption that the messages “reveal
enough” about the action profile that generated the underlying signals.
Notice that, except in the trivial case of perfect information, condition (2) rules
out the possibility that the signals  ￿￿  ZZ are independent conditional on A . In essence,
condition (2)   requires that if one player receives a signal that was unlikely conditional
on A , it is likely that the other player receive the corresponding unlikely signal – that is,
that the errors are correlated.
6
For a given   AM we can consider  \ 
 	 M
A 9 Q <  as a row vector. For player I we can
construct a matrix  ￿ MI
A 1  by stacking the row vectors corresponding to  	 II AA ￿   as  I A 
ranges over  I ! .  We can further stack the two matrices corresponding to the two players
to get a 	
 ￿￿   
 !!9 q matrix  M
A 1 . Notice that this matrix has two rows (both
corresponding to A ) that are identical.
Definition  2: A game has pure-strategy pairwise full rank with respect to M  if for every
pure  profile  a  the rank of  M
A 1 is 	
 ￿￿   !!  .
This condition is never satisfied in games such as Green and Porter [1984], where the two
players have the same sets of feasible actions, and the distribution of signals satisfies the
symmetry condition that  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ BB B B QQ  ,  but it is satisfied for a set of probability
measures  A Q  of  full Lebesgue measure.
                                                
6 Matsushima [1991] proved that payoffs of equilibria with truthful, incentive compatible
revelation of the signals every period are bounded away from efficiency in two-player
games with independent signals; subsequent work by Compte [1998] and Kandori and
Matsushima [1998] show  that it is possible to work with independent signals by
considering strategies that only report truthfully periodically.6
4. The Nash Threats Folk Theorem
Let  
 V  be a static Nash payoff vector. We may conveniently normalize  
 V  .
Fix a sequence of games with common 
  !:9 G, and with signal probabilities  N Q .
Theorem: Suppose there is a message profile M  and a  0 n >  such that for each N , game
n has  	 N FO  public information with respect to M , that   N F l , that these games have
common diagonal probabilities   \ 
	  \ 
	 MN M
AA 99 QQ ¸ ¸, and that  \ 
 	 M
A 9 Q ¸ has pure-
strategy pairwise full rank with respect to m.  Then there is a sequence   N H l  such
that for any feasible vector of payoffs   V   in the interior of the feasible set  there exists

 E   such that for any N and all  
 EE p  there is a perfect public equilibrium in the
game N with payoffs  N V satisfying  NN VVH .
Proof: To begin, we suppose that players use the given message profile m, and consider
public equilibria of the game whose public signals are the announcements.  When players
use m and their signals are highly correlated, they are likely (but not certain) to make the
same announcements.  Let ( be an auxiliary game of public information without public
randomizations, with the same payoff functions as in the original game, and whose
distribution over public signals is the conditional distribution on  
 9  generated by the
common diagonal probabilities.
7
Using the arguments from Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin [1994] and McLean,
Obara and Postlewaite [2003], one can show that for any e  V   strictly interior to the
feasible set there is an I such that for any interior  e VV p  there exists  e  E  , a   + 
and a set of payoffs V with V6  , and  e  II VV p  for all i and all   V6  , such that, for all
e EE   and every   V6  , there is a perfect public equilibrium  ￿ T with payoffs   V , such
that:
8
a)  the continuation payoffs  	 WY  lie in V for all  ￿ Y9  ,
b)    	  	   	 WY WY + E b 
                                                
7 That is, in the auxiliary game we ignore the possibility that the players might make different
announcements.
8 This follows from the facts that any compact convex subset of the interior of the positive feasible region is
self-generating for all sufficiently large E  and that the self-generation can be constructed to satisfiy
conditions a) through e) .7
c)   at every history the profiles either prescribe pure strategies or the strategies of
a static Nash equilibrium with payoff 0.
d)  if the strategies prescribe playing the static equilibrium given history  	 HT , the
continuation payoffs  	 WY W   are constant.
e)  whenever the current profile is other than a static Nash equilibrium, any
deviation from the current period equilibrium action costs at least  	 EI   in
current period average present value.
For any E  and an equilibrium satisfying the conditions above; we refer to the strategies
in this equilibrium as the base strategy. Our method of proof will be to use base strategies
to construct equilibrium strategies in the game of interest.
Fix a E.  Recall from the definition of public information that O  is the minimum
probability (for any N ) of disagreement given that one player lies. Define
	   	
e
+
Q
V
EE
O
  ,
which is a probability for E sufficiently large, and recalling that  MN
A Q  is the probability of
agreement. We now define
 	 MIN [  	  		]
 	 M A X [   	 ]
NM N M N
AA A
MN
AA
1Q
Q
EQQE
EQ
  
 
,
which is also a probability if  	 Q E  is.
We now consider the public information game with discount factor
	 N 1 EE E  .
We construct a map D from public histories  	 N HT  in the game of interest to the set of
histories of the same length in the public-information game (and the symbol 0  (for
punishment). This map induces strategies in the original game by assigning the profile
from the base game strategy when the history is mapped to a history in (, and by
assigning the static Nash equilibrium when the history is mapped to P. We will show that
these strategies form an equilibrium in the original game.
Formally, we define the strategies in the game N  by the action taken by the base
strategy, or the static Nash strategies respectively. The map D is defined as follows. We
map the initial null history to the null history. Given that all histories of length   T   have
been mapped, we define the map for length T  histories  ￿ 	    	   	 NN N N
TT HT HT Y W ￿  .8
When the history is understood, we will abuse notation and write  T A  to be the action
taken in the base strategy given the history    	 	 N HT D  . It is convenient also to define
 	  	  		
	
NM N
A N
MN
A
1Q
PA
EQ E
E
Q
 
 .
Notice that we have chosen  	  	 N Q1 EE  so that  	  N PA E b . Notice also that
 	 MIN NN 1 EQ p , so if MIN  MN
AA Q  , we also have  	  N PA E p .
Case 0: If the current base strategy profile is a static Nash equilibrium use the public
randomization  N
T W  choosing each 
** yY Î  with probability  	 
\ 
 	
T
NM
A 1Y 9 EQ  and setting
￿   	  	    		 
	 NN NN
TT HT Y W HT Y DD ￿    and with the remaining probability
￿   	   	 NN N
TT HT Y W 0 D ￿  .
Case 1: If  	
  	 N HT 0 D  ,  	
 	 N HT 0 D  , so punishment is absorbing.
Case 2: If  	
  	 N HT 0 D v  and  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
NN
TT YY ￿￿  , use the public randomization  N
T W  so
that with probability  	 N
T PAE  we have
￿￿   	   	    	 	  	 NN NN N
TT T HT Y W HT Y DD ￿￿  
and  ￿   	   	 NN N
TT HT Y W 0 D ￿   otherwise.
Case 3: If  	
  	 N HT 0 D v  and  ￿￿
NN
TT YY v , use the public randomization  N
T W  choosing
each 
** yY Î  with probability <>  	 
 \ 
 	
T
M
A QY 9 EQ   and setting
￿   	  	    		 
	 NN NN
TT HT Y W HT Y DD ￿     and with the remaining probability
￿   	   	 NN N
TT HT Y W 0 D ￿  .
The remainder of the proof, which is in the appendix, verifies that these strategies form
an equilibrium in game n with average payoffs 
n v  , and that there is a  sequence   N H l
such that  NN VVH .
Remark: The proof can easily be adjusted so that the equilibrium, except when the static
Nash equilibrium is played, is strict of order  	G E  , where  ￿ MAX  	 I AI GG A  .
Moreover if we perturb the game so that   GG F b  and   QQ F b , then for any9
fixed  d  the average discounted value of particular strategies changes by at most
   	 G FE  .  Hence if  ￿  
	 FE b , and the perturbed game still has a static
equilibrium with payoffs 0 the theorem continues to hold for the perturbed game and
discount factor  
 E . Tracing out the equilibrium payoffs corresponding to the various
histories, it follows that the convex hull of this set is self-generating for  
 E , and hence
by the results of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994] these are payoff of perfect public
equilibria for all  
  EE p This establishes the following corollary
Corollary: Fix a  message profile m, and suppose that  N GG l ,  N QQ l ,  that  game
N  has  	 N FO  public information with respect to M , that   N F l ,that  \ 
 	 M
A 9 Q ¸ , has
pure-strategy pairwise full rank with respect to M , and that each 
n g  has a static
equilibrium with payoffs converging to 0.  Then there is a sequence   N H l  such that
for any feasible interior vector of payoffs   V   there exists  
 E   such that for any
N and all  
 EE p  there is a perfect public equilibrium in the game N with payoffs
N V satisfying  NN VVH .
In particular, this covers the case in which the payoffs have the form  	 I RAZ and the
probabilities  N QQ l .
5. Discussion
A crucial element of these results is the fact that the announcements are public
information. Since there is already a folk theorem for games of public information, the
question arises as to whether or not it can be applied directly to the game with messages,
or whether in fact a separate proof is needed. Here we briefly indicate why the
Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin  (FLM) result does not apply to the announcement game.
The FLM folk theorem is limited to the convex hull of the set of profiles that
satisfy enforceability plus pairwise identifiability. Fix a profile, including a strategy for
sending messages. This determines for each player a probability distribution over
messages sent. We refer to this as the marginal. One thing a player could do is to
randomize his announcements independent of his private information, in such a way that
the marginal distribution of messages is preserved; call this “faking the marginal.”
Unless the given profile called for players to ignore their private signals, pairwise
identifiability fails, because player one faking his marginal and player two faking hers are
observationally equivalent, so the FLM result does not apply, and if we restrict attention10
to strategies where players make meaningless reports, the only public equilibria will have
a static equilibrium outcome in every period.
Turning to applications of the main theorem, one feature is that it allows the
possibility that players aggregate information by making the same announcement for
several different private signals.  Aggregating signals has two effects: First, it increases
the degree to which each player can forecast the other player’s message, which reduces
the role of private information. Second, it reduces the informativeness of the messages,
making it less likely that the assumption of pairwise full-rank is satisfied. However, when
each player’s signal space  I :  is at least as large as 	
 ￿ ￿   !!   (the minimum
size consistent with pairwise full rank) it is possible to aggregate the signals while still
allowing the messages to carry a substantial amount of information on the actions that
were played. This observation has some importance when we notice that the proof of the
Theorem remains valid even if we allow the space of private signals :  to vary, provided
that the set  
 9  remains fixed.  The working paper version of this paper gives an
illustrative example.
Appendix: Completion of the proof of the Theorem
We must verify that the strategies constructed in the text form an equilibrium in
game n with average payoffs 
n v  , and that there is a  sequence   N H l  such that
NN VVH .
Let  	 	 I VH T  be the average present values from following the base strategies in (
when the discount factor is  	 N 1 EE E  . It is convenient to do calculation in terms of
total present value, which we denote by .
Part (0): The Static Nash Equilibrium
Notice that whenever these strategies call upon players to mix, future outcomes
do not depend on current play, so incentive compatibility holds. The total present value
payoff is
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11
since we have normalized the payoff of the static equilibrium to  be 0.
The remainder of the proof considers payoffs and incentive compatibility when
the strategies call for a pure profile  T A .
Recall that the probability that the two players make the same announcement in
game N  is MN
A Q . Thus the total present values from following the corresponding strategies
in the game N  when the discount factor is E and the history   	 N HT   has not yet
reached the state 0
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where we have made use of the fact that the continuation payoff in the punishment state
is 0. Since this equation holds for every starting point, including the case in which the
current profile is static Nash, this implies the total present value payoff to using the
proposed strategies in the game N  with discount factor d  is the same as in the base game
with discount factor d .  Thus the average present value    	 	 NN
I VHT   in the n-game is
related to the average present value in the base game according to

   		   		

NN N
II VH T V H T
E
D
E

 

We now calculate the factor on the RHS:12
  	

  	MAX [ 	]

 MAX [ 	]
e
N
MN
AA
MN
AA
1
Q
+
V
EE E
EE
EE E Q
E
EQ
O



 

 
Recall that the theorem asserts the existence of equilibria in the n-games with average
payoffs 
n v  and a sequence   N H l  such that  NN VVH . If we take
MAX [ 	]
e
N MN
AA
+
G
V
HQ
O

then since MAX [ 	]  MN
AA Q l , so does  N H  as desired.
It remains to show that these strategies are indeed an equilibrium for the n-games.
To prove this, we will show that (1) no player has an incentive to choose a non-
equilibrium action when all players tell the truth, and that (2) it is optimal to use M
regardless of the action chosen.
Part (1): No player has an incentive to choose a non-equilibrium action given truth-
telling.
Let   	 II
T AA A ￿   represent a deviation for player I, that is  II
T AA v . We compute
the payoff to changing actions, while telling the truth13
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Because the base equilibrium is h-strict, the first two terms lose at least I (in total
present value) compared to playing the equilibrium action. Hence the gain to deviating is
at most14
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Then we observe
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Hence the gain to deviating is bounded by
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In other words there is no incentive to deviate, provided that N  is large enough
that
e
MAX MIN
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.
When this is true, we take  N H  as specified above, otherwise, take  N 5 H  .15
Part (2): It is optimal to use M  regardless of the action chosen.
Suppose the message  I Z  is received and that the action  I A  is chosen. Let
 	 II
T AA A ￿  . Also let  \ 	 N MN
YA I YZ QQ  , and 
 	 II YM Z  . Finally, set
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Playing  I A  and truth-telling results in total present value utility of
￿￿  	   	 
	  	  		 	 NN
II I YY GA VH T Y Q V EQ E Q E      .
Playing  I A  and telling the lie Y  results in
 	   	 	  	  		 	 NN
IY I Y I GA VH T Y Q V EQ E Q E      ,
so the gain to lying is
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This is less than or equal zero by the definition of  	 Q E .
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